How does a country's productivity growth a¤ect worldwide real incomes through international trade? In this paper, we take this classic question to the data by measuring the spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth. Our framework features traditional terms-of-trade e¤ects and new trade home market e¤ects as suggested by the theoretical literature and works from a reference point which perfectly matches industry-level trade.
Introduction
One of the classic propositions of international economics is that a country's productivity growth can not only bene…t but also harm its trading partners. In traditional models of interindustry trade based on comparative advantage, productivity shocks transmit only through terms-of-trade e¤ects. They tend to bene…t the trading partners if productivity growth is biased towards export-oriented industries and harm the trading partners otherwise (Hicks, 1953) . In newer models of intra-industry trade based on product di¤erentiation, productivity shocks also transmit through home market e¤ects. They tend to bene…t the trading partners if productivity growth is biased towards industries with a relatively high trade elasticity and harm the trading partners otherwise (Venables, 1987) .
Speci…cally, if a country's productivity growth is biased towards export-oriented industries, its trading partners' imports become cheaper relative to their exports so that their exports command more imports in world markets. The resulting welfare gains are the traditional terms-of-trade e¤ects mentioned above. Moreover, if a country's productivity growth is biased towards industries with a relatively high trade elasticity, the increase in its trading partners' aggregate price indices resulting from domestic exit out of these industries is smaller than the decrease in their aggregate price indices resulting from domestic entry into the other industries so that their aggregate price indices fall overall. The ensuing welfare gains are the new trade home market e¤ects referred to above. 1 In this paper, we take this proposition to the data by measuring the global spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth. We focus on two-digit manufacturing industries and the years 1995 to 2007. We …nd that the pattern of China's productivity growth exhibits no strong correlation with the export-orientation or trade elasticity of China's industries so that the resulting spillover e¤ects are relatively small. Speci…cally, our analysis suggests that the welfare of China's trading partners increases by a cumulative 0.7 percent due to terms-of-trade e¤ects but decreases by a cumulative 0.3 percent due to home market e¤ects on average. The cumulative welfare e¤ect on individual regions ranges between -1.2 percent for Russia and 3.6 percent for Asia (except Japan) and only 3.0 percent of the worldwide gains of China's productivity growth accrue to the rest of the world. In the US, welfare rises by a cumulative 0.4 percent due to China's productivity growth.
Our analysis is based on a multi-country multi-industry general equilibrium model of international trade featuring inter-industry trade as in Ricardo (1817) , intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980) , and …rm heterogeneity as in Melitz (2003) . On the theoretical side, it features terms-of-trade e¤ects as well as home market e¤ects which seems desirable in light of the forecited theoretical results. On the empirical side, it implies an industry-level gravity structure which allows us to measure the spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth from a reference point which perfectly matches worldwide industry-level trade. The …rm-level dimension is not essential to account for terms-of-trade and home market e¤ects, but is important to correct for Melitz (2003) selection e¤ects when estimating China's productivity growth.
Despite the considerable attention our subject received in the theoretical literature, there is relatively little related empirical work. Our paper is preceded mainly by Eaton and Kortum (2002) who illustrate their seminal framework by quantifying the spillover e¤ects of hypothetical US and German productivity shocks on other OECD countries. Eaton and Kortum's framework features only terms-of-trade e¤ects but no home market e¤ects and therefore ignores one of the channels through which productivity shocks transmit. Also, it predicts full specialization according to comparative advantage but allows only for aggregate productivity shocks so that productivity growth is always export-biased in e¤ect. 2 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the theoretical frame- 2 Fieler (forthcoming) provides a similar exercise in an Eaton and Kortum (2002) model with non-homothetic preferences. Additional work has emerged after our paper. Levchenko and Zhang (2011) calibrate a multi-sector Eaton and Kortum (2002) model to quantify the e¤ects of changes in Ricardian comparative advantage. Di Giovanni et al (2011) build on this and assess the welfare impact of China's trade integration and technological change.
work: it describes the basic setup, characterizes the equilibrium for given productivities, shows how to calculate the general equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks, and demonstrates how to isolate the welfare e¤ects of productivity shocks. Section 3 turns to the empirical application: it introduces the data, describes the estimation of the model parameters, explains the estimation of China's productivity growth, and reports the empirical results. 3 2 Theoretical framework
Basic setup
Our framework is based on a multi-industry extension of the Melitz (2003) model used by Arkolakis et al (2011) . There are N countries and S industries. Each industry provides consumers with a continuum of di¤erentiated varieties. Preferences over these varieties are summarized by the following utility functions
where x ijs is the quantity of an industry s variety from country i consumed in country j, M ijs is the number of industry s varieties from country i available in country j, s > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between industry s varieties, and js is the fraction of country j income spent on industry s varieties.
Firms are technologically heterogeneous which is captured by the following production process. Entrants into industry s of country i have to hire f e is units of labor in country i to draw their productivities ' from a Pareto distribution G is (') = 1
where f e is is a …xed cost of entry, b is is the Pareto location parameter, and s is the Pareto shape parameter.
Entrants into industry s of country i wishing to sell to country j further need to hire
units of labor in country i and f ijs units of labor in country j to deliver x ijs units of output to 3 In the interest of brevity, derivations are kept to a minimum in the main text. A detailed technical appendix is available upon request.
country j, where ijs 1 is an iceberg trade barrier and f ijs is a …xed cost of serving market j. Both the number of entrants into industry s of country i M e is and the fraction of entrants selling to country j M ijs M e is are endogenous. 4 Given only these basics, we can already anticipate some of the roles the model's traditional and new trade elements will play. In particular, the model will feature inter-industry trade as in Ricardo (1817) since the productivity distributions vary by country and industry. Also, there will be intra-industry trade as in Krugman (1980) since goods are di¤erentiated and consumers value variety. We will model an industry's productivity growth as an increase in the Pareto location parameter b is which shifts the entire distribution of possible productivity draws to the right. Since this will lead to changes in the number of entrants, productivity growth will not only have terms-of-trade e¤ects but also home market e¤ects which would not arise in Eaton and Kortum (2002) type environments.
Equilibrium for given productivities
Utility maximization implies that …rms in industry s of country i face demands
where p ijs is the delivered price of an industry s variety, P js the ideal price index of all industry s varieties, w j the wage rate, and L j the number of consumers or workers.
Pro…t maximization requires that …rms in industry s of country i whose productivity draws exceed ' ijs charge
where
s 1 denotes the productivity cuto¤ above which revenues are su¢ ciently high to justify incurring the …xed costs of serving market j. 4 In order to clearly expose the novel features of our framework, we do not allow for intermediate goods or nontraded goods which is in line with much of the theoretical literature. The idea is that intermediate goods tend to magnify the spillover e¤ects of productivity shocks while nontraded goods tend to dampen the spillover e¤ects of productivity shocks so that abstracting from both seems like a reasonable simpli…cation.
As usual, the ideal price index is given by P js = (
s . With the help of equation (3), it can be rewritten as
where e ' ijs = ( Free entry drives expected pro…ts down to zero so that
s is the probability that an entrant into industry s of country i sells to country j and E( ijs j' > ' ijs ) = w j f ijs are the expected operating pro…ts of an entrant into industry s of country i from selling to country j conditional on selling to country j.
Finally, labor market clearing ensures
where 
Together with condition (6), this represents a system of N+NS equations in the N+NS unknowns w i and M e is which can be solved up to a numeraire. An obvious problem, however, is that this system depends on a large set of unknown parameters which are all di¢ cult to estimate empirically.
General equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks
We avoid this problem by computing the general equilibrium e¤ects of productivity shocks using a method inspired by Dekle et al (2007) . In particular, conditions (6) and (7) can be written in changes as
where a hat denotes the ratio between the counterfactual and factual value, ijs
, and T ijs denotes the factual value of industry s trade from country i to country j.
Equations (8) and (9) To provide a sense of the nature of these general equilibrium adjustments, Table 1 reports the e¤ects of a hypothetical productivity shock in a simple example economy consisting of two countries (China and the US) and two industries (1 and 2). Productivity is assumed to grow by 10 percent in industry 1 of China and trade ‡ows are taken to be fully symmetric as detailed in the note to Table 1 . As can be seen, the productivity growth in industry 1 of China is predicted to cause an increase in the relative wage of China as well as entry into industry 1 of China, exit out of industry 1 of the US, exit out of industry 2 of China, and entry into industry 2 of the US.
Intuitively, expected pro…ts from entering into industry 1 become positive in China and negative in the US. As a result, there is entry into industry 1 of China bidding up wages so that there is also exit out of industry 2. Also, there is exit out of industry 1 of the US depressing wages so that there is also entry into industry 2. The pattern of entry and exit can also be understood in terms of two basic equilibrium constraints. First, labor market clearing requires that entry into one industry leads to exit out of the other industry in the same country. Second, constant expenditure shares imply that entry into one industry leads to exit out of the same industry in the other country.
Welfare e¤ects of productivity shocks
Given these general equilibrium adjustments of productivity shocks, the implied welfare e¤ects can be computed relatively straightforwardly. Changes in welfare are given by changes in real labor income which are changes in nominal labor income de ‡ated by changes in the ideal aggregate price index:
. Given the Cobb-Douglas structure of aggregate preferences, this can be rewritten in terms of changes in the ideal industry price indices as b
The trick is now to express changes in the ideal industry price indices as functions of changes in wages and entry only. This can be accomplished by rewriting equation (4) in changes after substituting the relationship M ijs = (
is and the de…nitions of ' ijs and e ' ijs which
As a result, changes in welfare can then be computed
To understand precisely how productivity shocks a¤ect welfare, it is useful to begin by contrasting two linear approximations of the growth rates of industry price indices. The …rst follows from equation (4) and reveals that changes in industry price indices are expenditure share weighted averages of changes in average prices and elasticity of substitution adjusted changes in available variety as one intuitively expects:
The second follows from the expression for b P js given above and shows that productivity shocks ultimately a¤ect industry price indices either directly or indirectly through changes in wages or entry:
). The links between these two approximations are given by two equations which can be derived using the relationship M ijs = (
and the de…nitions of ' ijs and e ' ijs .
The …rst link is that
0 which implies that changes in available variety have no net e¤ect on industry price indices so that the last term out of the …rst approximation simply drops out. The basic intuition for this result can be understood by considering the following variety e¤ects of China's productivity growth on the US economy. On the one hand, China's productivity growth implies that more Chinese varieties become available to US consumers as additional Chinese …rms start exporting to the US. On the other hand, China's productivity growth means that fewer US varieties remain available to US consumers since some US …rms are forced to shut down. The price index implications of these two e¤ects are exactly o¤setting so that changes in the overall number of varieties available to US consumers can be ignored.
The second link is that
is which implies 5 Notice that no further parameter estimates are required for this computation since js =
that only changes in average productivity induced either directly by changes in b is or indirectly by changes in M e is have a net e¤ect on P js . A corollary is that the basic Melitz (2003) selection e¤ects also cancel which is not too surprising since they mirror the abovementioned variety e¤ects. One the one hand, the fact that additional Chinese …rms start exporting to the US means that the average productivity of Chinese …rms serving the US market grows at a slower rate than China's productivity since these additional …rms have below average productivity.
On the other hand, the fact that some US …rms are forced to shut down means that the average productivity of US …rms serving the US market rises since the surviving …rms have above average productivity. 6 The only Melitz (2003) forcing some lower productivity …rms out of the US market. Under a realistic parametrization of industry expenditure shares, entry in the US has a stronger e¤ect on US competition than entry in China so that the former e¤ect dominates.
Given this background on how productivity shocks a¤ect industry price indices, it is now easy to see how productivity shocks a¤ect welfare. In particular, changes in welfare can be approximated as
which can be rewritten by substituting the second approximation
) from above. The resulting 6 These …ndings are related to the recent results by Arkolakis et al (2011), Feenstra (2010) , and Atkeson and Burstein (2010) that changes in trade barriers often have similar aggregate e¤ects in models with and without …rm heterogeneity. The …rm-level dimension of our setup proves useful in our empirical application where it allows us to correct for Melitz (2003) selection e¤ects when estimating China's productivity growth.
expression is just a linearized version of equation (10):
The …rst term
is the traditional termsof-trade e¤ect emphasized by Hicks (1953) . It captures the direct e¤ect changes in wages and productivities have on the prices of the goods produced by country j relative to the direct e¤ect changes in wages and productivities have on the prices of the goods consumed by country j. Country j bene…ts from an increase in the price of its production bundle relative to the price of its consumption bundle since its exports then command more imports in world markets.
The second term is the e¤ect productivity shocks in country j have on welfare in country j under autarky as follows straightforwardly from setting N = 1 in equations (9) and (11) . It simply says that a country's welfare growth under autarky is an expenditure share weighted average of that country's industry-level productivity growth as one intuitively expects. The previous two terms therefore capture the additional e¤ects arising under trade relative to autarky and thereby identify the channels through which productivity shocks transmit under trade. 7 7 Internationally, the terms-of-trade and home market e¤ects have a zero sum character. This can be seen most clearly in the special case s = and s = for all s since the worldwide average welfare e¤ect is then completely independent of terms-of-trade and home market e¤ects. In particular, it can be shown that equation (11) then implies
, where
To illustrate the key determinants of the signs of these spillover e¤ects, we now return to our simple example economy introduced above. Table 2 reports the e¤ects of a hypothetical 10 percent productivity growth in industry 1 of China on US welfare for three di¤erent scenarios:
China is a net exporter in industry 1, China is a net importer in industry 1, and there is no inter-industry trade. As one expects from the classic literature, the US experiences a terms-oftrade gain if China's productivity growth is biased towards China's export-oriented industry but a terms-of-trade loss if China's productivity growth is biased towards China's importcompeting industry.
One subtle di¤erence from the textbook analysis is that the terms-of-trade gain the US experiences if China's productivity growth is biased towards China's export-oriented industry exceeds the terms-of-trade loss it experiences if China's productivity growth is biased towards
China's import-competing industry. This is also re ‡ected in the fact that the US experiences a positive terms-of-trade e¤ect even if there is no inter-industry trade. This di¤erence is due to the existence of Krugman (1980) type intra-industry trade. In a sense, productivity growth always features an export-bias in a Krugman (1980) model since each country specializes in a unique set of varieties. Table 3 returns to the case of fully symmetric trade ‡ows and illustrates the role played by cross-industry di¤erences in s . It again reports the e¤ects of a 10 percent productivity growth in industry 1 of China on US welfare. As can be seen, the US experiences a positive home market e¤ect if China's productivity growth is biased towards the high s industry and a negative home market e¤ect if it is biased towards the low s industry. The intuition is that the s parameters govern the strengths of the counteracting industry price index e¤ects.
If s is low, there is a lot of variation in …rm productivity so that changes in the number of entrants lead to large changes in average productivity.
For example, if China's productivity growth is biased towards the high s industry, there is exit out of the high s industry in the US which tends to increase the aggregate price index in the US. At the same time, there is also entry into the low s industry in the US which tends to decrease the aggregate price index in the US. However, the latter e¤ect tends to dominate the former e¤ect since changes in the number of entrants induce larger changes in average productivity in the low s industry. This is because …rm productivity is more dispersed in the low s industry so that adding or dropping marginal …rms has a larger e¤ect on average productivity in that industry.
Overall, this discussion suggests two key determinants of the sign of the global spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth: the correlation between China's productivity growth and China's export-orientation, and the correlation between China's productivity growth and the Pareto shape parameters s which can alternatively be interpreted as trade elasticities in this environment. Of course, the magnitude of the global spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth also depends critically on the pattern and volume of international trade as captured by the import shares js ijs in equation (11).
Empirical application
We now apply our framework to isolate and decompose the spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth between 1995 and 2007. 8 For this purpose, we need the complete matrix of industry-level trade ‡ows T ijs , industry-level estimates of the elasticity parameters s and s , and industry-level estimates of China's productivity growths b b is . We obtain this information on an annual basis for 34 2-digit manufacturing industries and 17 countries or regions comprising the world. We explicitly include only the largest economies and aggregate all other countries by nearest continent. 8 Before we apply our framework, we actually extend it in two simple ways. First, we introduce an exogenous trade surplus parameter along the lines of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to deal with the aggregate trade imbalances observed empirically. Second, we relax the implicit assumption that the free entry condition always binds in all countries and industries to allow for possible corner solutions in which some countries abandon some industries entirely. We discuss the resulting generalizations of equations (8) - (10) together with our solution algorithm in the appendix.
Estimation procedure for T ijs
Our data on international trade ‡ows is from the standard NBER-UN database which covers most countries in the world. 9 For the US and China, we compute internal trade ‡ows as industry output minus industry exports which we take from the standard NBER-CES database and the Annual Survey of Industrial Production. The Annual Survey of Industrial Production is a census of all state-owned plants and all large private plants collected by China's National Bureau of Statistics. Additional details on this dataset can be found, for example, in Hsieh and Klenow (2009). 10 For all other countries, we estimate internal trade ‡ows from aggregate production data using the following procedure: First, we impute aggregate output by dividing aggregate value added from the standard World Bank-WDI database by 0.312 which is the number for value added reported by Dekle et al (2007) . Then, we compute aggregate expenditure from aggregate output, minus aggregate exports, plus aggregate imports. Finally, we calculate internal trade ‡ows by multiplying aggregate expenditure with US industry expenditure shares and subtracting industry imports.
Estimation procedure for s and s
We estimate the demand elasticities s using the theoretical prediction that industry wage payments are proportional to industry revenues with the factor of proportionality being equal to s 1 s . 11 Instead of using wage payments, we use factor payments, that is the sum of payments to capital and labor. Calculating factor payments involves the rental rate of capital which we obtain by assuming that the sum of factor payments across all industries amounts 9 We updated the NBER data using Comtrade and would like to thank Robert Feenstra for his assistance. 1 0 The NBER-CES data is only available until 2005. We estimate internal trade ‡ows for the US and other countries in 2006 and 2007 based on the 2005 US industry expenditure shares using the procedure explained below. 1 1 Strictly speaking, the model predicts that variable industry wage payments are proportional to industry revenues given the assumption that …xed costs are also incurred in terms of labor. We do not take this assumption literally when taking the model to the data and treat all reported factor payments as variable factor payments. to 2 3 of the sum of revenues across all industries. We make this assumption since it implies a plausible aggregate pro…t share of 1 3 . We estimate the trade elasticities s using the estimates of s and the theoretical prediction that …rm sales follow a Pareto distribution with shape parameter s s 1 within industries. We follow Eaton et al (forthcoming) in restricting attention to exporters only and back out the shape parameter of the …rm sales distribution from a regression of the logarithm of the …rm sales rank on the logarithm of …rm sales. For our estimation of s and s , we use data on wage payments, capital stocks, and …rm sales from the Chinese Annual Survey of Industrial Production described above.
Estimation procedure for b b is
Our estimation of China's productivity growth proceeds in two steps. In the …rst step, we estimate the productivity growth of the representative Chinese …rm in each industry b e ' iis .
In the second step, we calculate the fundamental Chinese productivity growth b b is in each industry from b e ' iis by correcting for Melitz (2003) selection e¤ects. Recall that an increase in the Pareto location parameter b is shifts the entire distribution of possible productivity draws to the right. It di¤ers from e ' iis because not all Chinese entrants …nd it optimal to serve the Chinese market given the …xed costs f iis .
Our model suggests to estimate b e ' iis as the growth rate of real industry output per worker.
To see this, recall that employment in a given …rm is given by P j ijs x ijs (') ' which can be manipulated after substituting the pricing formula to yield b e
, where S is are the total sales in industry s of country i and L is is the total employment in industry s of country i. 12 The representative price p iis (e ' iis ) is an output share weighted average of the prices charged by domestic producers in the industry which follows from rewriting it as
We estimate b e ' iis using our data from the Annual Survey of Industrial Production. Instead of computing the growth rate of industry output per worker, we compute the growth rate of industry output per composite factor of production which we take to be a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of capital and labor. We calculate the labor shares from the shares of wage payments in industry revenues net of pro…ts and the capital shares as the residuals of these labor shares.
We proxy for the representative price p iis (e ' iis ) using producer price de ‡ators which we obtain from the China Statistical Yearbook. and ignoring them would have indeed biased our productivity growth estimates for some industries to a sizeable degree. 13 Table 4 reports the share of manufacturing imports from all countries in domestic manufacturing expenditure by country. Excluding China, this share has increased from 20.8 percent to 26.6 percent over the sample period on average. Table 5 presents the share of manufacturing imports from China in domestic manufacturing expenditure by country. Excluding China, this share has increased from 1.1 percent to 3.9 percent over the sample period on average. While manufacturing imports from China therefore only account for 5.3 percent of total manufacturing imports in 1995 on average, they already account for 14.7 percent of total manufacturing imports in 2007 on average, re ‡ecting the rising importance of China to the world economy. Table 6 lists our estimates for the elasticities s and s for all industries. As can be seen, 1 3 In particular, the correction ranges from -5.8 percentage points until 0.4 percentage points and averages -0.2 percentage points for the annualized productivity growth estimates which we present below. our estimates of s range from 1.7 to 19.5 and average 7.4 and our estimates of s range from 0.8 to 22.0 and average 7.9. These averages are within the range of existing estimates found in the literature. Eaton and Kortum (2002) , for example, estimate the trade elasticity to be 3.6 in one speci…cation and 8.3 in another speci…cation. Notice that our estimates of s and s are such s is sightly larger that s 1 throughout. This is consistent with our earlier theoretical assumption that s > s 1 and implies that the sales distribution slightly deviates from Zipf's law. It ensures that the expected pro…ts of entrants are always …nite in all industries.
Results
To attenuate possible measurement error in our productivity growth estimation, we take China's productivity growth rates in each year to be the geometric average of the estimated productivity growth rates over all years. These averages are also listed in Table 6 and their distribution is plotted in Figure 1 . As can be seen, China's productivity growth rates are large and vary substantially across industries. They range from 7.4 percent to 24.3 percent and average 13.8 percent. Figures 2 and 3 relate these productivity growth rates to China's export-orientation and the trade elasticity s . Most notably, there is no strong correlation visible in either …gure which suggests that the spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth will not be large. Figure 4 plots the distribution across China's trading partners of the simple average of the predicted annual changes in wages relative to China's wage over all years. 14 The underlying annual wage changes are computed from the extensions of equations (8) and (9) Notice that China's productivity growth slightly exceeds China's relative wage growth on average which indicates that China's trading partners will bene…t 1 4 Recall that we take "labor" to be a Cobb-Douglas aggregate of capital and labor in our empirical application. As a consequence, changes in "wages" should then also be thought of as changes in Cobb-Douglas aggregates of interest rates and wages. For expositional simplicity, we continue to use the term "wages" in the text.
somewhat through terms-of-trade e¤ects.
The upper panel of Figure 5 plots the simple average of the predicted annual changes in the number of entrants in China over all years against China's estimated productivity growth.
The underlying annual changes in the number of entrants in China are again computed from the extensions of equations (8) and (9) given in the appendix and capture what would have happened to the number of entrants in China if nothing but China's productivity had changed.
Not surprisingly, the model tends to predict entry into China's fast-growing industries and exit out of China's slow-growing industries. Moreover, the lower panel of Figure 5 illustrates that the extent of entry and exit in China is particularly large in high trade elasticity industries as one intuitively expects. Table 7 summarizes the predicted welfare e¤ects of China's productivity growth. The …rst column gives the predicted welfare e¤ects on China, the second and third columns the predicted welfare e¤ects on the "World" and the "Rest of the World" de…ned as the output share weighted averages of the predicted welfare e¤ects on all countries and all countries other than China, and the last column the ratios of the entries in columns three and two. The predicted welfare e¤ects are computed using the extension of equation (10) given in the appendix and capture what would have happened to welfare if nothing but China's productivity had changed. The last row computes the cumulative e¤ects by taking geometric averages of the annual e¤ects in the previous rows.
As can be seen, China's welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 520.5 percent, "World" welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 21.18 percent, and "Rest of the World" welfare is predicted to increase by a cumulative 0.634 percent. This implies that only 3.0 percent of the worldwide bene…ts of China's productivity growth are predicted to spill over to other countries. There are three main reasons for this result. First, there is no strong correlation between China's productivity growth and China's export orientation so that there are no large terms-of-trade e¤ects. Second, there is no strong correlation between China's productivity growth and the trade elasticity s so that there are no large home market e¤ects.
And …nally, the share of Chinese imports in total expenditures is still fairly small in most countries even though it has grown fast over time. Table 8 reports the cumulative spillover e¤ects on all countries and decomposes them into terms-of-trade and home market e¤ects following approximation (11) . As can be seen, the welfare e¤ects range from -1.23 percent to 3.64 percent and average 0.29 percent. The decomposition reveals that the terms-of-trade e¤ects are always positive and the home market e¤ects are typically negative. The terms-of-trade e¤ects are always positive despite the slight negative correlation between China's productivity growth and China's export-orientation due to the abovementioned Krugman (1980) intra-industry trade e¤ects. The home market e¤ects are typically negative because of the slight negative correlation between China's productivity growth and the trade elasticity s . Notice that part of the variation in the magnitudes of the spillover e¤ects is simply explained by the variation in the extent of trade integration with China documented in Table 5 . For example, the welfare e¤ects on Other Asia are large because of the strong trade integration with China. Similarly, the welfare e¤ects on Brazil are small because of the weak trade integration with China. Table 9 decomposes the terms-of-trade e¤ects into their bilateral components vis-a-vis China and their multilateral components vis-a-vis all other countries. The former component is the direct e¤ect of China's productivity growth combined with the indirect e¤ect resulting from the adjustments of relative wages vis-a-vis China. The latter component is the indirect e¤ect resulting from the adjustments of relative wages vis-a-vis all other countries. China's productivity growth is often feared to impose strong adverse multilateral terms-of-trade e¤ects on economies whose exports compete directly with Chinese exports in third markets. 15 While our analysis con…rms the existence of such adverse e¤ects for some emerging economies like Brazil and Mexico and some manufacturing strongholds like Germany and Japan, it also suggests that their overall welfare implications are rather small.
Conclusion
How does a country's productivity growth a¤ect worldwide real incomes through international trade? In this paper, we took this classic question to the data by measuring the spillover e¤ects of China's productivity growth. Our framework featured traditional terms-of-trade e¤ects and new trade home market e¤ects as suggested by the theoretical literature and worked from a reference point which perfectly matched industry-level trade. Focusing on the years 1995 to 2007, we found that the cumulative welfare e¤ect on individual regions ranged between -1.2 percent and 3.6 percent and only 3.0 percent of the worldwide gains of China's productivity growth accrued to the rest of the world.
Our analysis is only a …rst pass at this question. Of the many possible extensions, a particularly interesting one would be to let aggregate manufacturing employment respond endogenously to productivity growth. On the one hand, this would dampen relative wage growth in China thereby generating additional terms-of-trade gains for the rest of the world.
On the other hand, this would relocate aggregate manufacturing employment to China thereby in ‡icting additional home market losses on the rest of the world. These counteracting e¤ects may well been quantitatively important in the case of China given the extent of rural-urban migration observed during the sample period.
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As mentioned in footnote (8), we extend our basic framework in two simple ways before taking it to the data. First, we introduce an exogenous trade surplus parameter N X j along the lines of Eaton and Kortum (2002) . This yields the following generalizations of equations (8) - (10):
where j
are adjustment terms which reduce to 1 if N X j = 0. N X j can be computed from observed industry net exports N X is using the relationship N X j P S s=1 ( s 1)( s+1) s s N X js . 16 Second, we relax the implicit assumption that the free entry condition always binds in all countries and industries which results in the prediction of negative entry if zero pro…ts are not compatible with positive production. Speci…cally, we do not immediately compute the counterfactuals with the actual vector of productivity growths but instead take slowly increasing fractions of it, starting at zero and progressing in one percentage point steps.
Whenever the number of entrants is predicted to be less than 1 percent of its original value in a particular country and industry, c M e is < 0:01, we replace equation (13) for that country and industry with the condition that there is no entry in that country and industry, c M e is = 0, thereby imposing a corner solution. is necessary since the model also features endogenous aggregate net exports in general due to the assumption that the …xed cost of exporting are paid in destination country labor which generates international transfers of income. Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the terms-of-trade e¤ect (column 1) and the home market e¤ect (column 2) from 10% productivity growth in China in industry 1 following equation (11) .
Tables
Column 3 calculates net welfare gain following equation (10) . Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the same in both countries, industry expenditure shares are 50% in both countries and industries, theta1=theta2=5, and sigma1=sigma2=3. In the …rst row, China is assumed to have an import expenditure share of 5% in industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 15% in industry 2 with the US being the mirror image so that
China is a net exporter in industry 1. In the second row, import expenditure shares are assumed to be 10% in both countries and industries so that there is only intra-industry trade. In the third row, China is assumed to have an import expenditure share of 15% in industry 1 and an import expenditure share of 5% in industry 2 with the US being the mirror image so that China is a net importer in industry 1. Notes: Entries are predicted growth rates in US real income due to the terms-of-trade e¤ect (column 1) and the home market e¤ect (column 2) from 10% productivity growth in China in industry 1 following equation (11) .
Column 3 calculates net welfare gain following equation (10) . Simulation assumes that nominal incomes are the same in both countries, industry expenditure shares are 50% in both countries, import expenditure shares are 10% in both countries and industries, and sigma1=sigma2=3. In the …rst row, theta1=7 and theta2=3. In the second row, theta1=5 and theta2=5. In the third row, theta1=3 and theta2=7. (10), columns 2-3 the terms-of-trade e¤ects and home market e¤ects following equation (11), and column 4 the sum of columns 2-3. We have no trade data for Russia until 1996 so that all entries for Russia refer to the years 1996 to 2007 only. 
